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Abstract Policymaking power enables governments to redistribute income to pow-
erful interests in society+ However, some governments exhibit greater concern for
aggregate welfare than others+ This government behavior may itself be endogenously
determined by a number of economic, political, and institutional factors+ Trade pol-
icy, being fundamentally redistributive, provides a valuable context in which the
welfare-mindedness of governments may be empirically evaluated+ This article inves-
tigates quantitatively the welfare-mindedness of governments and attempts to under-
stand these political and institutional determinants of the differences in government
behavior across countries+
Although all governments are endowed with policymaking powers to redistribute
income to powerful interests in society, some governments exhibit greater con-
cern for aggregate welfare than others+ Government behavior may itself be endog-
enously determined by a number of economic, political, and institutional factors+
For instance, in the presence of a weak system of checks and balances or a low
level of political competition, it may be easier for governments to redistribute
resources toward those special interests they favor+ It is the goal of this article to
study quantitatively the relative welfare-mindedness of governments in a large sam-
ple of countries and to try and understand the differences in government behavior
across countries using economic, political, and institutional factors+
We proceed in two steps+ The first step is to quantify the extent to which gov-
ernments are concerned with aggregate welfare relative to any other private inter-
ests+ This requires data in which the redistributive powers of governments are
inherent, and which reflect the particular tradeoff between aggregate and private
interest+ In our analysis, we use trade policy determination as the context in which
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government behavior is evaluated+ There are at least two reasons for this+ First, it
is well established in theory and in empirical work that trade policy, like many
other government policies, is redistributive and is used by governments to favor
certain constituents over others+1 Second, the recent theoretical literature in this
area ~following the work of Grossman and Helpman2! offers a parsimonious and
empirically amenable structural platform that is suitable for estimating the pri-
mary parameter of interest: the relative preference of a governments for aggregate
welfare over private rents, that is, the welfare-mindedness of governments+ This
relative weight is known in the literature ~detailed below! as the parameter a+3
The results from the first step, using data from more than fifty countries, show
substantial variance across countries in the weight that their governments place on
aggregate social welfare versus their private interests ~the a parameter!+ For instance,
the estimates for countries such as Nepal, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Malawi are
many-fold lower than for Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, and the United States+
Although the parameter a is taken to be primitive in the Grossman-Helpman
model, the wide variation in a across countries hints at more fundamental factors
underpinning a+We therefore view the results from the first step as coming from a
model where the determinants of a are a “black box+” In the second step we unpack
the box+ Doing so requires a continuity between the model that produced the first-
step estimates of a, and the models admitting details about what might determine
these a’s+ We specifically consider models in which trade policy is determined as
the outcome of electoral competition and legislative bargaining+ They suit our pur-
pose well, and we use them to advance new hypotheses about associations between
political, institutional, and economic variables on the one hand, and the prefer-
ences of policymakers on the other+ Differences in the electoral setups or legisla-
tive decision process make some governments more inclined to maximize social
welfare when making trade policy decisions and other governments less inclined
to do so+ This theory-based empirical analysis distinguishes our study from other
cross-country studies about the associations between institutions and policy
outcomes+
Empirically, we report a number of new findings+ The greater the proportion
of the population that is informed, the larger is government’s concern for wel-
fare+ The less ideologically beholden the public is to the parties in the legisla-
ture, the more welfare-maximizing is their government+ The more productive is
media advertising, the greater is the demand by politicians for special interest
money ~in order to sway uninformed voters while contesting elections!, and the
1+ Schattschneider 1935; and Baldwin 1985 have spawned an enormous political economy litera-
ture+ They are substantiated using voting data in Hiscox 2002; Bohara et al+ 2005; Baldwin and Magee
2000; and McGillivray 1997+
2+ Grossman and Helpman 1994+
3+ Empirical work here, largely focused on U+S+ data, include Goldberg and Maggi 1999; Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay 2000; McCalman 2004; Mitra, Thomakos, and Ulubasoglu 2002; and Eicher and
Osang 2002+ Gawande and Krishna 2003 survey this field+
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lower is the government’s concern for welfare+ Executive checks and balances on
the powers of the legislature increase the weight on welfare, while electoral com-
petition for the executive lowers it since candidates for the executive rely on
special interest money to sway uninformed voters+
The rest of the paper is organized as follows+ In the first section, we derive the
Grossman-Helpman prediction of endogenous trade policy determination that
enables estimation of the welfare-mindedness of governments+ Industry-level data
from fifty-four countries are used in the estimation exercises+ These data and the
resulting estimates are described in the second section+ The third section derives
hypotheses from electoral competition and legislative bargaining models of trade
policy formation+ A number of hypotheses about the relationship between specific
institutional variables and the welfare-mindedness of governments are stated+ These
hypotheses are then taken to the data in the fourth section+ The variables are
described and the results are empirically analyzed+ The final section concludes+
What Governments Maximize: Theory
This section presents the Grossman-Helpman ~henceforth GH94! model+ It pro-
vides the theoretical basis for our estimates of the extent of government concern
for welfare relative to private gain+ The presentation in this section is formal, because
we wish to emphasize that our empirics are tightly linked to theory+ Readers less
interested in the technical derivation may skip to the second section directly after
reading up through equation ~1!+ It will be beneficial, however, to intuitively under-
stand equation ~5! since it provides the link between the first and second steps in
this article+ The GH94 model is a simple general equilibrium political economy
model that features a ~unitary! government of a small open economy that values
both its population’s welfare as well as money contributions by import-competing
producers who gain from increased profits+ Since trade policy may be used by gov-
ernment to increase domestic prices over world prices, import-competing produc-
ers organize politically into lobbies and pay the government in order to distort prices
using tariffs on imports+ The equilibrium tariffs are the result of governments max-
imizing their objective and lobbies doing similarly+ Intuitively, this is based on the
following calculus+
We mentioned that the government is interested not only in lobbying money but
is also concerned about the collective welfare of its public+ Suppose it weighs a
dollar of its public’s welfare and a dollar of lobbying contributions equally+ Then
the government will require lobbies to pay up to the extent of the welfare loss that
the tariff, which benefits the lobbies, inflicts on the public+4 If government’s rela-
tive weight on public welfare is ten times larger than on money contributions, for
4+ This is exact in the simpler version of the GH94 model we use below, but approximate in the
more detailed GH94 model+
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example, then it will require lobbies to pay ten times as much as the welfare loss
from the price distortions+ If the government is willing to sell out its public cheaply
then it will require less in contributions from lobbies than the amount of the wel-
fare loss+
The extent of the welfare loss, in turn, depends importantly on the elasticity of
import demand+ Lobbies, on the other hand, calculate their optimal money contri-
butions on the basis of the rents they expect to receive from the tariffs+ These, in
turn, depend ~positively! on the output-to-import ratio+ Thus, the tariffs set in
political-economic equilibrium depend on import demand elasticities and output-
to-import ratios in each sector+ The main advantage of the GH94 model is that it
provides an explicit relationship between tariffs and these measurable variables
that may be used to estimate the relative weight that a government places on wel-
fare versus contributions+ This relationship appears in equation ~8!+
The purpose of the rest of this section is to derive equation ~8! formally+ Our
notation here borrows from GH94 and Goldberg and Maggi+5 Consider a small
open economy with n1 tradable sectors+ Individuals in this economy are assumed
to have identical preferences over consumption of these goods represented by the
utility function:
U  c0(
i1
n
ui ~ci !, ~1!
where good 0 is the numeraire good whose price is normalized to one+ The addi-
tive separability of the utility functions eliminates cross-effects among goods+ Con-
sumer surplus from the consumption of good i , si , as a function of its price, pi , is
given by si~ pi !  u~d~ pi !!  pi d~ pi !, where d~ pi ! is the demand function for
good i + The indirect utility function for individual k is given by v k  y k 
(i1
n
si
k~ pi !, where y k is the income of individual k+
On the production side, the numeraire good is produced using labor only under
constant returns to scale, which fixes the wage at one+ The other n goods are pro-
duced with constant returns to scale technology, each using labor and a sector-
specific input+ The specific input is in limited supply and earns rents+ The price of
good i determines the returns to the specific factor i , denoted p~ pi !+ The supply
function of good i is given by yi~ pi ! p '~ pi !+ Since rents to owners of a specific
input increase with the price of the good that uses the specific input, owners of
that specific input have a motive for influencing government policy in a manner
that raises the good’s price+
Government uses trade policy, specifically tariffs, that protect producers of
import-competing goods and raise their domestic price+ The world price of each
good is taken as given+ For good i the government chooses a specific ~per unit!
5+ Goldberg and Maggi 1999+
494 International Organization
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090171
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 13:50:04, subject to the Cambridge Core
import tariff, tis , to drive a wedge between the world price, pi0 , and the domestic
price, pi , pi  pi0 tis+ The tariff revenue is distributed equally across the popula-
tion in a lump-sum manner+
Summing indirect utility across all individuals yields aggregate welfare W+Aggre-
gate income is the sum of labor income ~denoted l !, the returns to specific factors,
and tariff revenue+ Therefore aggregate welfare ~as a function of domestic prices!
is given by:
W  l(
i1
n
pi ~ pi !(
i1
n
ti
s Mi ~ pi !(
i1
n
si ~ pi !, ~2!
where imports Mi  di  yi +
We also assume that the proportion of the population of a country that is repre-
sented by organized lobbies is negligible+6 This allows us to ignore the incentives
to lobby for lower tariffs on goods that are consumed, but not produced by owners
of specific factors, as well as the incentives to lobby for higher tariffs on goods
that are neither consumed nor produced, but that generate tariff revenue+ While
this assumption is imposed on the theoretical model, it is based on relatively solid
empirical grounds, as consumer ~and taxation! lobbies are uncommon relative to
producer lobbies+ In other words, in our setup, lobbies only care about the rents to
their specific factor+ More formally, the welfare of lobby i is simply given by:
Wi  pi ~ pi !+ ~3!
The objective function of the government reflects the trade-off between social wel-
fare and lobbyists’ political contributions+ These contributions may be used for
personal gain, or to finance re-election campaigns, or a variety of other self-
interested expenditures that may buy the government favor with its constituents+
Thus, the government’s objective function is a weighted sum of campaign contri-
butions, C, and the welfare of its constituents, W:
G  aW C aW(
iL
Ci , ~4!
where the parameter a is the weight government puts on a dollar of welfare rela-
tive to a dollar of lobbying contributions+ Lobby i makes contribution Ci to the
government and therefore maximizes an objective function given by Wi  Ci +
We presume that the equilibrium tariffs arise from a Nash bargaining game
between the government and lobbies+ Goldberg and Maggi show that this leads to
6+ This is equivalent to assuming that ownership of specific factors is highly concentrated in all
sectors+
What Governments Maximize and Why 495
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090171
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 13:50:04, subject to the Cambridge Core
the same solution as does the use of the menu auction model employed in Grossman
and Helpman+ The Nash bargaining solution maximizes the joint surplus of the
government and lobbies given by the sum of the government’s welfare, G, and the
welfare of each lobby net of its contributions+ The joint surplus becomes
V  aW(
i
Wi , ~5!
Note that ~5! implicitly assumes that all sectors are politically organized+7 This is
true of manufacturing sectors in most advanced countries, where political action
committees ~United States! or industry associations ~Europe! lobby their govern-
ments+ Such industry coalitions are prevalent in developing countries as well+ Other
than in the United States, rules and regulations requiring lobbying activity to be
reported are blatantly absent+ We take this lack of transparency as proof of the
pervasiveness of lobbying activity+ Since our analysis is conducted at the aggre-
gation level of twenty-eight International Standard Industrial Classification ~ISIC!
three-digit level industries, the assumption that all industries are organized is an
empirically reasonable one+8
Under the two assumptions that all sectors are organized and a negligible pro-
portion of the population is organized into lobbies, the joint surplus takes the sim-
ple form:
V  l(
i1
n
@a1#pi(
i1
n
a~ti
s Mi si !+ ~6!
The first order conditions are:
@a1#Xi a@di tis Mi'~ pi !Mi #  0, i1, + + + , n+ ~7!
Solving, we get the tariff on each good that maximizes the joint surplus:
ti
1 ti

1
a
 Xi 0Mi
ei
, i1, + + + , n+ ~8!
In equation ~8! ti  ~ pi  pi0!0pi0 is the ad valorem tariff for good i, where pi is the
domestic price for good i at home and pi0 is its world price+ Xi 0Mi is the equilib-
rium ratio of output to imports and ei  Mi'{pi 0Mi is the absolute elasticity of
7+ That is, all sectors are able to solve collective action problems in organizing for lobbying+ For a
model that endogenizes lobbying organization see Mitra 1999+
8+ In the U+S+ data, for instance, significant contributions to the political process are reported by all
three-digit industries+
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import demand+ Thus, producers of good i are able to “buy” protection ~ti  0!+
Industry output, Xi, captures the size of rents from protection+ Imports determine
the extent of welfare losses from protection, so the smaller are the imports the
higher is the tariff+ The well known rule about taxation according inverse-elasticity
is in evidence here: the lower is the absolute elasticity, ei, the greater is the price
distortion, and conversely+ Known as the Ramsey-pricing rule in the economics
literature, it is the least inefficient way to distort prices, since it creates the small-
est welfare loss+
What Governments Maximize:
Comparative Estimates of a
Equation ~8! suggests a simple way of estimating the trade-off parameter a+ Rewrite
~8! as
ti
1 ti
{ei{
Mi
Xi

1
a
i1, + + + , n+ ~9!
We use a stochastic version of this equation to estimate the parameter a+ The data,
described below, are across industries and time for each of fifty-four countries+
Indexing the time series by t, the econometric model we use to estimate the a’s is
tit
1 tit
{ei{
Mit
Xit
 b0 eit i1, + + + , n, ~10!
where the error term eit is identically independently normally distributed across
observations for any specific country, with homoscedastic variance s 2 + The vari-
ance is allowed to vary across countries+ The coefficient b0  10a+ Taking the
output-to-import ratio and the import elasticity to the left-hand side ~lhs! of the
equation mutes issues concerning endogeneity to tariffs of output, imports, and
the elasticity of import demand+
Model 10 is estimated for a set of fifty-four high, middle, and low-income coun-
tries+9 For these countries we have tariff data ~incompletely! across twenty-eight
three-digit ISIC industries over the 1988–2000 period+10
9+ They are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Hungary, Indonesia, India,
Korea, Sri Lanka,Mexico,Malawi,Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago,
Turkey, Taiwan, Uruguay, Venezuela, South Africa, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Costa Rica,Morocco, Nepal,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Kenya, Latvia, Pakistan, Romania, Austria, Denmark, Spain, Finland,
France, United Kingdom, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United
States, Hong Kong, and Singapore+
10+ Tariffs are applied most-favored nation rates from the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development ~UNCTAD! TRAINS database at the six-digit HS, which were mapped into the three-
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Industry level output and trade data are from the World Bank’s Trade and Pro-
duction database constructed by Nicita and Olarreaga+11 We use the import demand
elasticities estimated for each country at the six-digit Harmonized System ~HS!
level by Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga+12 Since the standard errors of the elasticity
estimates are known, they are treated as variables with measurement error and
adjusted using a Fuller-correction+13 The import demand elasticities are missing
for four countries—Ecuador, Nepal, Pakistan, and Taiwan+ For them we use the
industry averages of the elasticity estimates taken across all other countries+
Estimates of the coefficient b0 in equation ~10!, denoted 10a, and its standard
error are displayed in Table 1 for the fifty-four countries+ Inverting these coeffi-
cients yield estimates of the parameter a+ They appear in the last column of Table 1+
Several interesting and surprising features of these estimates are evident in Table 2,
where countries are sorted by their a estimates+ In general, richer countries have
higher values of a than poorer countries+ That is, governments of richer countries
are revealed by their trade data to place a much greater weight on a dollar of
welfare relative to a dollar of private gain ~contributions!+ The last two columns
indicate that countries with a  10 have per capita incomes at the level of Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development ~OECD! countries ~with the
exception of Brazil and Turkey!+ Middle income countries have fairly high values
of a+ All South American economies in our sample, with the exception of Bolivia
~0+68!, fall within this group+ Other notable liberalizers come from Asia: India
~2+72!, Indonesia ~2+62!,Malaysia ~3+13!, Philippines ~2+84!+ The lowest a’s belong
to the poor Asian nations of Nepal ~0+06!, Bangladesh ~0+16!, Pakistan ~0+74!, and
Sri Lanka ~0+93!, and the African nations of Ethiopia ~0+17!, Malawi ~0+25!, Cam-
eroon ~0+30!, and Kenya ~0+84!+
An important feature of our results is that, in contrast with previous examina-
tions of the Grossman-Helpman model,14 our estimates of a are reasonable, both
qualitatively ~poorer countries have smaller a’s than richer countries! and quanti-
tatively ~only extremely low-tariff or zero-tariff countries like Hong Kong and
Singapore have a’s greater than 50, while this was routinely found for Turkey,
Australia, and the United States in the studies referenced above!+We find the cross-
country variation in a to be striking and intuitively pleasing+ Countries with low
a’s accord with the widely accepted view that governments in those countries are
also among the most corrupt in the world+ Indeed the Spearman rank correlation
digit ISIC industry level+ Where missing, tariffs are augmented by World Trade Organization ~WTO!
applied rates, constructed from the WTO’s IDB and WTO’s Trade Policy Reviews+ They are closely
correlated+
11+ Nicita and Olarreaga 2007+
12+ Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga 2008+
13+ Fuller 1986; see also Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000+ This correction limits the influence
of outlying estimates with large standard errors, which would otherwise grossly overstate the true
elasticity+
14+ Goldberg and Maggi 1999; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000; Mitra, Thomakos, and Uluba-
soglu 2002; McCalman 2004; and Eicher and Osang 2002+
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between the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index for the year
2005 and our measure of government willingness to trade off social welfare for
political rents is 0+67, and we can statistically reject the assumption that the two
series are uncorrelated+ In 2005 the Transparency International Corruption Percep-
tion index rank of the two countries at the bottom of our a rankings ~Nepal and
Bangladesh! were 121 and 156 out of 157 countries, respectively+ Similarly, the
Transparency International Corruption index rank of the two countries at the top
of our a rankings ~Singapore and Taiwan! were 5 and 15, respectively+
Some results we find to be surprising are ~1! the low a for Mexico, despite its
membership in the North American Free Trade Agreement ~NAFTA!, ~2! the lower
than expected a for the OECD countries of Norway, Ireland, and the Netherlands
~in the 3  a  5 group!, ~3! the relatively high a’s for the socialist countries in
transition, including Poland, Hungary, and Romania, ~4! the relatively high a’s for
Japan and China, both of whom have been criticized for being mercantilistic—
protectionist and export-oriented+
TABLE 1. Estimates of a
Country ccode 1/a se(1/a) a Country ccode 1/a se(1/a) a
Argentina ARG 0+19 0+02 5+25 Kenya KEN 1+16 0+33 0+86
Austria AUS 0+11 0+01 8+79 Korea KOR 0+06 0+00 16+15
Bangladesh BGD 6+34 2+27 0+16 Sri Lanka LKA 1+08 0+18 0+93
Bolivia BOL 1+47 0+20 0+68 Latvia LVA 0+17 0+01 5+75
Brazil BRA 0+04 0+00 24+91 Morocco MAR 0+87 0+14 1+14
Chile CHL 0+21 0+02 4+83 Mexico MEX 0+77 0+07 1+29
China CHN 0+12 0+01 8+33 Malawi MWI 3+93 1+17 0+25
Cameroon CMR 3+31 2+54 0+30 Malaysia MYS 0+32 0+02 3+13
Colombia COL 0+13 0+01 7+88 Netherlands NLD 0+35 0+05 2+85
Costa Rica CRI 0+50 0+07 1+98 Norway NOR 0+24 0+05 4+22
Germany DEU 0+09 0+01 11+55 Nepal NPL 15+56 5+66 0+06
Denmark DNK 0+12 0+01 8+10 Pakistan PAK 1+35 0+31 0+74
Ecuador ECU 0+81 0+14 1+23 Peru PER 0+21 0+03 4+85
Egypt EGY 0+80 0+18 1+24 Phillipines PHL 0+35 0+03 2+84
Spain ESP 0+07 0+00 15+16 Poland POL 0+13 0+01 7+48
Ethiopia ETH 5+92 2+26 0+17 Romania ROM 0+11 0+01 9+25
Finland FIN 0+09 0+01 10+57 Singapore SGP 0+00 0+00 404+29
France FRA 0+09 0+01 10+96 Sweden SWE 0+08 0+03 12+28
U+K+ GBR 0+08 0+01 11+86 Thailand THA 0+94 0+17 1+06
Greece GRC 0+20 0+02 5+11 Trinidad and TTO 0+90 0+16 1+11
Guatemala GTM 0+65 0+08 1+53 Tobago
Hong Kong HKG 0+00 0+00 ` Turkey TUR 0+07 0+00 14+53
Hungary HUN 0+25 0+02 3+96 Taiwan TWN 0+12 0+01 8+53
Indonesia IDN 0+38 0+09 2+62 Uruguay URY 0+28 0+02 3+62
India IND 0+37 0+05 2+72 United States USA 0+04 0+01 26+14
Ireland IRL 0+29 0+04 3+50 Venezuela VEN 0+18 0+01 5+41
Italy ITA 0+07 0+01 13+42 South Africa ZAF 0+19 0+02 5+13
Japan JPN 0+03 0+00 37+81
Notes: Hong Kong has zero tariffs+ In the runs with fifty-four observations ~full sample! Hong Kong’s a is set to
10,000+
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TABLE 2. Countries ranked by their estimates of a
a , 1 2 , a  1 3 , a  5 5 , a  10 10 , a
Nepal 0+06 Thailand 1+06 Indonesia 2+62 Greece 5+11 Finland 10+57
Bangladesh 0+16 Trinidad and Tobago 1+11 India 2+72 South Africa 5+13 France 10+96
Ethiopia 0+17 Morocco 1+14 Phillipines 2+84 Argentina 5+25 Germany 11+55
Malawi 0+25 Ecuador 1+23 Netherlands 2+85 Venezuela 5+41 United Kingdom 11+86
Cameroon 0+30 Egypt 1+24 Malaysia 3+13 Latvia 5+75 Sweden 12+28
Bolivia 0+68 Mexico 1+29 Ireland 3+50 Poland 7+48 Italy 13+42
Pakistan 0+74 Guatemala 1+53 Uruguay 3+62 Colombia 7+88 Turkey 14+53
Kenya 0+86 Costa Rica 1+98 Hungary 3+96 Denmark 8+10 Spain 15+16
Sri Lanka 0+93 Norway 4+22 China 8+33 Korea 16+15
Chile 4+83 Taiwan 8+53 Brazil 24+91
Peru 4+85 Austria 8+79 United States 26+14
Romania 9+25 Japan 37+81
Singapore 404+00
Hong Kong `
Notes: China, Ethiopia, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are excluded from the remainder of analysis+ Only democracies during 1988–96 are included+
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These unexpected results emphasize the fact that the theoretical model does
not base its prediction simply on openness ~low or high tariffs!, but also on the
import-penetration ratio, and import demand elasticities, as well as their covari-
ance with tariffs, and each other+ The incidence of tariffs in industries with high
import demand elasticities reveals the willingness on the part of governments to
~relatively! easily trade public welfare for private gain,15 since in welfare-oriented
countries the most price-sensitive goods should be distorted the least+ The inci-
dence of tariffs in industries with high import-to-output ratios also reveals the will-
ingness on the part of those governments to trade public welfare for private gain
since distorting prices in high-import sectors creates large deadweight losses+ Empir-
ically, this is not only revealed by the surprising estimates discussed above, but
also by the relatively low correlation between our estimates of a, and average tar-
iffs, which is estimated at 0+33, and compares badly with the correlation with the
index of perceived corruption+ Thus, the estimates underscore the need to consider
more than simplistic measures of openness in order to make inferences about the
terms at which different governments trade public welfare for private gain+ The
Grossman-Helpman measure is not only theoretically more appropriate, but also
empirically appears to be quite distinct from simpler measures+
We are ultimately interested in the deeper question of why governments behave
as they do+ What explains the variation in the estimates of a across countries?
Why do some countries have low a’s and others high a’s? Are polities in poorer
countries content to let their governments cheaply trade their welfare away? If so,
why? And why in richer countries do we observe the opposite? These are the ques-
tions to which we devote the remainder of the article+
Explaining the Variation in a: Theory
To explain why a varies across countries we delve into institutional foundations of
policymaking+ In this, we can take one of two routes+ One is a data-driven approach
that involves choosing a set of variables that adequately describe institutional details
of the policy process in different countries, and use them to econometrically explain
the cross-country variation in a+ Such a method would shed light on those institu-
tions that motivate governments to behave as they do in setting trade policy+ The
second is to seek structural explanations of how institutions might explain the vari-
ation in a across countries+We opt for the latter in this article, since it continues in
the tradition of the GH94 model that delivered our estimates for a+16
Positive theories that model policy outcomes based on institutional details of
the policy process fall into three broad categories+17 Electoral competition models
15+ This results in a high estimate of b0 and low estimates of a+
16+ A data-driven factor-analytic approach yields results that reinforce many of the findings in this
article+ They are available to interested readers+
17+ Helpman and Persson 2001+
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focus on the process by which parties are represented in the legislature, and fea-
ture details about the structure of voter characteristics ~informed versus uninformed!
and voter preferences+ Lobbying models focus on lobbying process and feature
details about the lobbying game+ Legislative bargaining models feature specific
legislative decision making processes that may emphasize, for example, agenda-
setting and the allocation of policy jurisdictions ~for example, ministers, commit-
tee chairs!+ In the first part of this paper, we used the GH94 lobbying model to
estimate the weight put on social welfare from trade policies of governments+ But
the determinants of these weights were a “black box+” The objective of this sec-
tion is to unravel the determinants of a as viewed from the theoretical lens of
electoral competition and legislative bargaining models+
Electoral Competition and Lobbying
Integrating lobbying and electoral competition has been done in three important
models, respectively, by Austen-Smith, Baron, and Grossman and Helpman+18 They
model policies as outcomes from the interaction of two parties and special interest
groups that make lobbying contributions to them+ They differ in the motives of the
lobbyists+ Lobbyists are purely interested in altering electoral outcomes in Austen-
Smith and Baron+ In Grossman and Helpman, lobbyists are also able to influence
policy outcomes by altering party platforms via lobbying+ We will abstract from
the electoral motive and focus on this influence-seeking motive in order to con-
nect the a parameter with more primitive institutional details+ To this end, we
describe the 1996 Grossman-Helpman ~henceforth GH96! model+
Two parties, A and B, contest an election for seats in the legislature+ Each party
advances a slate of candidates, and the country votes as a single constituency+
Once elections are over, and the votes counted, both parties occupy seats in leg-
islature in proportion to the popular vote count ~more on the distinction between
this proportional system and a pluralitarian system below!+
There are two classes of voters, informed and uninformed+ The former have
immovable preferences based on ~1! the policy position of each party and ~2! other
characteristics of the party ~liberal, conservative!+ Uninformed voters, on the other
hand, may be induced to move from their current position via campaign expendi-
tures on slogans, advertising, and other informational devices designed to impress
them+ The difference in campaign spending by the two parties crucially deter-
mines how many uninformed voters they will be able to move to their side+ For
this reason, politicians representing each party demand contributions+ Lobbies form
to supply contributions+
On the lobbying side we consider the case, as in the GH94 model, where each
sector is represented by a single lobby, but the fraction of the organized popula-
tion represents a negligible proportion of the total population+ Each lobby is inter-
18+ See Austen-Smith 1987; Baron 1994; and Grossman and Helpman 1996+
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ested only in protecting its own sector, and there is no competition or conflict
among lobbies+19 Each party thus receives contributions from multiple lobbies,
with each lobby’s interest being a single element of the vector p+ The game com-
prises of two stages+ In the first stage, lobbies announce their contribution sched-
ules ~as a function of the tariff afforded to their sector!, one to each of the two
parties ~party A and party B!+ In the second stage, the two parties choose their
vector of tariffs ~their policy platforms! in order to maximize the representation of
their party in the legislature+ The lobbies then pay their promised contributions,
the parties wage their campaigns, and the legislature0congress that assumes office
implements one of the party’s tariff vector ~legislative processes are a black box
in electoral competition models—we unpack this box below!+
A political microfoundation for a is found in the structural analog of the expres-
sion for the joint surplus in equation ~5!, which may be written separately for each
lobby i as:
Vi  Wi ~ti ! aW~ti !, i1, + + + , n+ ~11!
In the GH94 unitary government case, the politically optimal tariffs in each sector
i is set by the government in a way that maximizes the weighted sum of the aggre-
gate welfare of lobby i and the aggregate welfare of the country’s citizens+ The
government is induced by lobby i to weight the lobby’s interest by ~1 a!, which
is greater than the weight of a it places on the public’s aggregate interest+We will
observe a parallel between equation ~11! and the joint surplus in the electoral com-
petition game, and we use it to pin down the determinants of a from the param-
eters of the electoral competition game+
Grossman and Helpman ~1996, p+ 274 eq+ ~4!! show that the joint surplus in
the electoral competition game involving parties A and B and one ~say, sector i !
lobby is
Vi
K  fKWi ~ti !
1 a
a
f
h
W~ti !, K A,B+ ~12!
As in equation ~11!, Wi~ti ! is the ~net of contributions! welfare of lobby i + In
equation ~12!, W~ti ! is the aggregate welfare of informed voters+ There are four
parameters to consider+ a is the fraction of voters who are uninformed+ If a  0,
then W~ti ! becomes the welfare of the average voter, just as in equation ~11!+ We
will see below that buying the support of uninformed voters makes special
interests groups important to political candidates, and a determines the magni-
tude of the importance of special interest contributions+ f  0 quantifies the diver-
19+ This exemplifies Baron’s idea of “particularistic policy” whose benefits are exclusively enjoyed
by those who lobby for it, but the costs are not onerous on others; see Baron 1994+
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sity of views about the two parties among voters in terms of all fundamental
characteristics ~for example, liberal-conservative! except their policy positions about
the tariff ti + The closer is f to zero the greater is the diversity of views; the larger
is f the closer are the two parties perceived to be+ This parameter is relevant
because the more important these divergences among the parties are to voters—
the more committed they are to a particular party for ideological reasons, for
example—the less likely they are to be swayed by trade policy+ h  0 quantifies
the ability of campaign spending to move the position of an uninformed voter+
The greater is h, the more productive is a dollar of campaign spending in influ-
encing the uninformed voter+ Since money becomes a useful instrument with which
to sway the uninformed voter, the sources of this money—special interest groups—
become useful to the political candidates+ Finally, fK is the probability that, once
elections are over, the legislature actually adopts party K’s trade policy platform
~sector i tariff promised by party K before the election!+ With two parties, fA
 fB  1+ We will see below the relevance of this key parameter in formulating
testable hypotheses+
The parallel with equation ~11! is clear+ Equation ~12! shows that each party is
induced by lobby i to maximize a weighted sum of the aggregate interest of
informed voters and the aggregate interest of members of organized interest groups+
The aggregate interest of informed voters ~interest groups! receives a weight that
increases ~decreases! with the share of informed voters in the population ~1 a!,
decreases ~increases! with the diversity of their views about the parties’ ideologi-
cal positions, and decreases ~increases! with how easily uninformed voters are
swayed by campaign spending+ We will use these and other observations to make
empirically testable predictions+
Predictions
Proportional vs. Pluralitarian Systems
In a proportional system seats in the legislature are allocated to the two parties
according to the proportion of the popular vote+ With just two parties, and the
country voting as a single constituency, the objective of maximizing the number
of seats in legislature is equivalent to maximizing plurality+ That is, the outcome
is exactly the same as if the system of representation were majoritarian+ The GH96
model is such a two-party one-constituency model+ The real world is different in
two important respects+
First, a country typically votes not as a single constituency, but as several geo-
graphically distinct constituencies+ In a typical majoritarian system each district
elects a single representative to the legislature+ In a typical proportional system
each district is represented by multiple candidates so that a district’s seats are
divided between the two parties in proportion to the popular vote+ If districts are
heterogeneous, say, with respect to the composition of specific factors, then it is
possible for a majoritarian system to favor special interests more than a propor-
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tional system+ This is demonstrated theoretically in Grossman and Helpman+20 They
advance a two-party three-good, three-district model in which the districts are het-
erogeneous in the composition of ~three! specific factors+ There are no lobbies,
however, each legislator seeks to represent the interests of their average constitu-
ent+ Grossman and Helpman show that if both parties seek a majority21 in the
legislature then, because the election of legislators is tied to particular geographic
or economic interests, there is greater protection than if legislators’ interests were
more closely tied to the national, not regional, interests+
Consider the two-party three-district example under a system of proportional
representation in which candidates from both parties compete for multiple seats
within the same district+ Evans22 shows that it is more likely in the case of pro-
portional representation that one party sweeps the election, that is, wins a major-
ity in all three districts, than under a majoritarian system ~in which the single seat
per district is determined by majority vote in each district!+ If one party sweeps
the election, the policy it chooses reflects national, not regional, interests, that is,
free trade+23 Thus, a majoritarian system of representation leads to greater protec-
tion than proportional one+24
This result does not require the presence of lobbies because the model is devoid
of uninformed voters+ If lobbies were admitted, what does this result imply about
the distribution of a across the two systems of political representation? We sur-
mise that since a majoritarian system is predisposed to being protectionist ~it has a
lower probability of sweeping the states than a proportional one!, lobbies will ensure
their interests are weighed more heavily in equation ~12! in majoritarian systems
than in proportional ones+ That is, all else constant, a’s are lower in proportional
than in majoritarian systems+ A formal demonstration of this requires extending
the GH96 single-district electoral competition model with uninformed voters ~whose
presence motivates the existence of lobbies! to n districts+25 We state our first
hypothesis as:
H1: A majoritarian system favors special interests more than does a proportional
system. Majoritarian systems are therefore associated with low a’s.
It is possible that the three-district example exaggerates the predisposition of
proportional systems to be less protectionist than majoritarian ones, so that as the
20+ Grossman and Helpman 2005+
21+ Ibid+ This objective is different from maximizing the number of seats as in GH96+
22+ Evans 2008+
23+ Grossman and Helpman 2005, eq+ 4+
24+ Rogowski’s 1987, 208, prescient logic argued that since proportional systems make states more
independent from rent-seekers than majoritarian systems, the former lead to more stable and long-
lived political commitments to free trade than the latter+ The reason for this is that proportionate sys-
tems result in stronger ~and fewer! parties than majoritarian systems+
25+ This exercise is outside the scope of this paper and left open for future research+
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number of districts increases, the probability of sweeping the districts becomes
more remote and the distinction between the two systems disappears+ A rejection
of hypothesis ~1! would then indicate that the world is well-approximated by the
GH96 two-party single-district model in which proportional representation is equiv-
alent to plurality+
The second difference between the GH96 construct and the real world is that
democracies typically have more than two parties+ In the data section we attempt
to reconcile the two-party theoretical model with multiparty governments that we
find in the data+
Uninformed Voters
Consider the fraction a of uninformed voters+ A comparison of the weights on W
in equations ~11! and ~12! indicates that, all else held constant, a r 0 as a r 1+
The intuition for this result is this+ In the absence of lobbying, parties will choose
their platform to attract the maximum number of informed voters+ Denote this
tariff as ti*+ To persuade party A to adopt a tariff ti , lobby i must contribute an
amount that delivers at least as many uninformed votes as would ti*+26 The larger
is the proportion of uninformed voters a, the more pivotal the uninformed voter
becomes+ Since the resources for launching a campaign to sway uninformed vot-
ers are provided by lobby i , the lobby’s welfare ~here profits! gets greater weight
in equation ~12!+ This leads to our second prediction:
H2: The larger is the proportion of uninformed voters in the population, the lower
is a, and conversely.
Given the cross-country distribution of a, testing this hypothesis amounts to
testing the validity of the uninformed voter construct itself+ The existence of
uninformed voters is central to the GH96 model since it motivates the existence
of lobbies+ It is also central to a number of models that feature Baron’s idea of the
uninformed voter+
Party Ideology
Consider the ideological divide between the two parties given by parameter f+
The larger is f, the smaller is the diversity of views among voters over the fun-
damental characteristics of the two parties+ A comparison of the weights on W in
equations ~11! and ~12! indicates that, all else held constant, a r 0 as f r 0+
The reason why the weight put on social welfare increases as f increases is this+
With little diversity of views among voters, a tariff that deviates from that favored
26+ Grossman and Helpman 1996 ~p+ 274! show that this amount equals ~~1  a!0a!~ f0h!@W~ti*!
 W~ti !# +
506 International Organization
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090171
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 13:50:04, subject to the Cambridge Core
by the average voter does great damage electorally+ When there is great diversity
of views and the two parties are considered to be very dissimilar, the parties can
afford to set ~district i ’s! tariffs different from ti* and still retain the favor of
voters who were inclined to vote for them on the basis of, say, ideology+ In con-
trast, if voters are indifferent between the two parties’ basic characteristics, a pol-
icy that deviates from ti* risks losing many voters to the other party+ This leads to
our third prediction:
H3: The greater is the perceived difference in the fundamental characteristics of
the two parties in the eyes of voters, the lower is a, and conversely.
In sum, if voters are clearly predisposed to one party or the other on the basis
of attributes other than their policy platforms, then both parties are more cheaply
able to impose welfare costs on the public+ The parties will calculate that they
gain more uninformed voters than lose the votes of their supporters+
Susceptibility of the Uninformed Voter
Finally, consider the productivity of campaign spending parameter h+ A compari-
son of the weights on W in equations ~11! and ~12! indicates that, all else held
constant, ar 0 as hr `+With greater power of the dollar to influence uninformed
voters, it is less costly to deviate from ti*+ Hence, as h increases, both parties are
induced to place greater weight on the interest of lobby i than on the interest of
the informed public+ This leads to our fourth and last prediction from the electoral
competition model:
H4: The greater is the ability of a dollar of campaign spending to influence
uninformed voters, the lower is a, and conversely.
We now turn to the interactions among legislators and the process by which
decisions are made within legislatures+
Legislative Bargaining and Lobbying
The Baron-Ferejohn model27 is the proven workhorse in the area of legislative bar-
gaining+Models of legislative decision making have had to struggle with Arrow’s28
result that it is not possible to select the best action from a set of alternatives accord-
ing to some voting rule ~for example, majority wins!+ The breakthrough has been
the introduction of an agenda setter who is granted institutional power to cham-
pion a specific alternative and who attempts to guide voting in the direction of that
27+ Baron and Ferejohn 1989+
28+ Arrow 1963+
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agenda+ Regardless of whether that agenda is selected over the status quo, a voting
equilibrium exists+
We adapt Persson’s legislative bargaining model29 of public goods provision
with lobbying to search for more hypotheses about the determinants of a+ An
attractive feature of the legislative bargaining model is that it allows us to link a
with asymmetric powers of legislators+ Specifically, it motivates the role of
checks and balances on those powers, without which there would be extreme
redistribution+
To make our point simply, consider legislation of a slate of tariffs $ti , i1, + + + , n% +
Assume that sectors are regionally concentrated—in each of the n districts is located
one sector+ Every district sends one representative to the legislature+ However, there
is an exogenous institutional constraint on the amount of protection: the welfare
loss from the set of tariffs0subsidies may not exceed a prespecified amount+ This
constraint may be satisfied by limiting the number of sectors that receive protec-
tion, or limiting the level of tariffs0subsidies, or both+ The existence of such a
constraint is motivated below+ Each legislator maximizes an objective function
that is the sum of the welfare of the constituents in her district and the rents obtained
from tariff policy+30 That is, a legislator cares specially about the rents from the
tariff to her sector, over and above other components of welfare+ There are two
reasons for this assumption+ One is that it is consistent with the existence of lob-
bies that pay the legislators for producing these rents+ The other is votes: the elec-
toral competition model in which the money is used to get uninformed voters to
vote for the legislator may be embedded here+
First, consider how the legislature sets the tariff vector when there are no lob-
bies+ The legislative bargaining game follows a typical sequence of events: ~1! a
legislator is chosen to be an agenda setter S; ~2! she makes a policy proposal for
adopting the vector $tiS %; ~3! the legislature votes on the proposal, and if it gets
simple majority $tiS % is implemented+ Otherwise, the status quo outcome, say $tio%,
is implemented+ The agenda setter is obviously interested in using her powers to
benefit her district, but must obtain a majority that goes along with her tariff agenda
$ti
S %+ She must therefore guarantee at least the same payoff to the legislators she
courts as they would receive under the status quo+31 Persson shows that the agenda
setter will set an agenda that forms a minimum winning coalition composed of a
simple majority such that ~1! legislators ~sectors! outside of the winning coalition
get no tariffs0subsidy even though they bear part of the welfare loss, ~2! the mem-
bers of the winning coalition get just enough protection0subsidy that they are not
worse off than in the status quo+
29+ Persson 1998+
30+ In Persson’s model legislators may each attach different weights+ We presume all legislators
attach the same positive weight+
31+ In the presence of the welfare loss constraint, she must sacrifice some rents that would have
otherwise gone to her district in order to form a coalition of legislators that would implement her
agenda+ More on this below+
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The logic behind this stark, rather pessimistic, result is that intense competition
among legislators to be part of the winning coalition enables the agenda setter to
dictate terms+ This competition drives down the “price” ~or weakens the terms! a
legislator can charge the agenda setter+ The agenda setter uses her powers to pro-
vide the highest rents possible to her district, since the competition among legis-
lators endows her with bargaining power+
The same logic drives the results when we introduce lobbying into the game+
Suppose every sector ~district! has an organized lobby that makes contributions to
their legislator+ Their fierce desire to have their legislator be part of the winning
coalition cedes any bargaining ability they may have to the agenda setter+ Their
contributions are unable to move the agenda in their favor+ An interesting result in
the lobbying game is that since no sector outside the district of the agenda setter
receives any protection0subsidy, they contribute close to zero+32
Checks and Balances. Checks against the agenda setter’s powers may be placed
by an individual with influence over policy at the national level, say, a president+
His policy platform consists of a specific limit on welfare losses from price dis-
tortions+ Our exogenously specified limit on welfare loss is thus motivated as a
way of instituting checks and balances+ Once again, the same conclusion applies—
competition among legislators still enables the agenda setter to get away with what
rents are possible+ The difference is that the rents are lower if the elected president’s
platform is more limiting than the status quo+33
Clearly, a direct way of enhancing the bargaining power of legislators other
than the agenda setter, and thus checking her powers, is via a binding limit on the
rents the agenda setter can direct to her district+ Such a national policy would then
allow the legislative bargaining game to allocate rents to other districts+ Regard-
less, both types of presidential platforms—limits on the amount of total welfare
loss, or limits to the rents accruing to the agenda setter’s district—will result in a
lower redistribution compared with a legislature that does not allow representa-
tion of a nationwide polity capable of checking legislators+We state the first hypoth-
esis from the legislative bargaining game+34
H5: Executive checks will limit the ability of legislators to impose their politically
optimal welfare losses. Greater checks are therefore associated with higher values
of a.
32+ The model may be extended to incorporate the two-party electoral competition model in deter-
mining the legislator chosen to represent a district+ Then, the diversity across districts in the param-
eters a, h, f, and f then underlies each legislator’s a parameter+ This may well determine which legislators
are in the winning coalition ~that is, the cheapest for the agenda setter to buy off !, but the fact still
remains that competition among legislators will lead to the same policy+
33+ Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997 give deeper meaning to what it means for the executive to
wield checks and balances, specifically via separation of powers+
34+ The legislative bargaining game has an additional step: the executive chooses a limit on the
total welfare loss ~or the rents to the agenda setter’s district!+ The other three steps follow as before+
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Our final two hypotheses go beyond the existing literature, and feature electoral
competition for the executive+ An unsatisfactory aspect of legislative bargaining
theory is its presumption that the executive represents median voter interests+ In
most real-world democracies the executive is elected and lobbied+ We therefore
embed the two-party electoral competition game into the legislative bargaining
model+
Electoral Competition for the Executive. Two candidates, representing par-
ties A and B respectively, contest the presidential election+ The structure of the
game is essentially similar to the game used to model electoral competition for
legislative seats+ The main difference here is that the presidential platforms con-
cern not the tariff directly but limits on the total welfare loss from trade protection
denoted OL+ The executive is presumed to maximize an objective function such as
equation ~4!, except that the argument is OL ~the set of tariffs t are determined con-
ditional on OL, see ~13! below!+ When there are no lobbies, the executive seeks to
maximizes national welfare and sets OL  0, eliminating the possibility of any tar-
iff or subsidy+ Lobbies representing import-competing producers attempt to move
OL away from zero so that they might benefit from tariffs, conditional on OL, that are
decided in the legislative bargaining process+
The cap on welfare loss, OL, is determined as the outcome of the two-party elec-
tion in which a national polity of informed and uninformed voters participate+ Thus,
OL for each of the two presidential candidates is determined as the Nash bargaining
solution to35
Max OLVPK  fPK(
i
Wi ~ OL!
1 a
a
f
h
W~ OL!, K A,B, ~13!
where Wi~ OL! is the ~net of contributions! welfare of the lobby from district i and
W~ OL! is the welfare of the average informed voter, a is the fraction of uninformed
voters, f quantifies the diversity of views about the two parties among voters, and
h is productivity of campaign spending+ fP is the probability that, once elected,
the president is able to get the legislature to adopt OL+
The first result follows directly from equation ~13!+ The parameter fPK—the
probability of successfully legislating candidate K’s executive platform—determines
the weight that special interests get in the executive electoral competition game+
If fPK is non-negative then the first term on the right-hand side of equation ~13!
indicates that OL is selected to be greater than zero by both candidates+ Thus, elec-
toral competition with lobbies and uninformed voters induces both candidates to
impose welfare loss on the national polity+ The parameters a, h, and f work to
35+ The logic behind equation ~13! is similar to the logic behind equation ~12! in the legislative
electoral competition game+
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change a in the same direction when there is electoral competition for the exec-
utive as they did with electoral competition for seats in legislature+ We state this
hypothesis as the next hypothesis+
H6: Electoral competition for the executive is associated with lower values of a
than if there were no electoral competition for the executive.
Importantly, the parameter fPK determines the executive’s ability to impose
checks on legislature’s powers+ When government is undivided, that is, when the
executive and legislature both belong to the same party, the executive’s platform
is more likely to make it past the legislature than were government divided+36 Thus,
~13! implies that the higher is fPK ~undivided government!, the more the executive
platform of candidate K is bent to satisfying special interests at the expense of the
public+ Conversely, if fPK is low ~divided government!, the executive is a more
effective check on the legislature’s ability to impose welfare costs on the public+37
We state this as our final hypothesis+38
H7: Divided government leads to higher values of a than if the party of the exec-
utive were the same as the majority party in the legislature.
Explaining the Variation in a: Data and Results
Data
Recent interest in the influence of institutions over economic and political out-
comes has led to the creation of cross-country databases of political institutions+
We draw on the high-quality Database on Political Institutions ~DPI! constructed
by Beck and colleagues+39 The database contains a number of variables measuring
the nature of “government,” “legislatures,” “executive,” and “federalism+” They
are measured both qualitatively and quantitatively, and admirably serve our pur-
pose of measuring the variables required to test the hypotheses+ We also use eco-
nomic data from various issues of the World Development Indicators ~WDI!+Media
cost data are from World Advertising Trends ~WAT!+40
36+ See, for example, Elgie 2001+
37+ An opposite argument, advanced by Lohmann and O’Halloran 1994, is that a divided govern-
ment does not delegate policymaking powers to the president, while a government with a clear major-
ity in the legislature does+ Divided government favors protectionism since each legislator cares about
private benefits and costs of protection to their own district and not the social costs+
38+ Our working paper with the same title shows how the legislative bargaining theory may be
completed+
39+ Beck et al+ 2001+
40+ World Advertising Trends 1998+
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The theory upon which we base the empirical investigation requires us to con-
sider only democracies+41 We rely on the variable LIEC ~Legislative Index of Elec-
toral Competitiveness! in the DPI database to identify democracies+ LIEC scores
vary between 1 ~no legislature! and 7 ~largest party received less than 75 percent
of the seats!+ Lower scores are given to unelected legislatures ~score 2! or if the
legislature is elected but comprises just one candidate ~score 3! or just one party
~score  4!+ Countries with scores of 4 or less are not considered to have legisla-
tures featuring electoral competition+ Only countries in which multiple parties con-
tested for seats in the legislature ~scores of 5 or more! are considered in the sample+
Among the fifty-four countries for which we have estimated the parameter a, only
four are dropped on this count ~China, Hong Kong, Ethiopia, Taiwan!+42
Testing hypothesis ~1!, requires identifying legislatures elected using a propor-
tional system of representation—where seats are allocated on the basis of the pro-
portion of votes received—versus a pluralitarian first-past-the-post system+43 The
variable housesys in the DPI is used to identify countries with proportional ver-
sus pluralitarian systems+ housesys is coded 1 in the DPI only if the majority of
the house is elected on a plurality basis+ We define the binary variable propor-
tionality  1  housesys to indicate legislatures in which parties are ~largely!
represented proportionally to the votes they receive+44
We must reconcile the theoretical model, which admits only two parties, with
the presence in our data of many countries with multiparty governments+ How the
probability of successfully legislating the platform of the party in power changes
when there are more than two parties is the main question that must be addressed+
The greater this probability ~that is, large fK!, the greater the weight given to
special interests in equation ~12!, and the lower is a+ In a government comprising
more than one party and0or an opposition that also comprises a coalition of par-
ties, the probability of successfully legislating the winning party’s platform hinges
on party concentration and cohesiveness+45 Furthermore, Powell and Whitten46 have
argued that retrospective economic voting ~giving the government credit or blame
41+ A recent literature has argued in favor of democracies on the broader issue of whether democ-
racies produce better trade policy outcomes than nondemocracies+ See Milner and Kubota 2005; and
Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2000, 2002+
42+ Taiwan had an LIEC score of 2 during the early 1990s, the period from which we used data to
estimate its a+
43+ The influence of proportional versus other systems of electing legislatures has been well
researched in the context of protection+ See Mansfield and Busch 1995; Willmann 2005; and Evans
2008+
44+ The DPI contains the variable pr that takes the value 1 if any candidates are elected based on
the proportion of votes received by their party and 0 otherwise+ Even a small fraction the legislature is
elected using both, then pr is coded 1+ Another variable plurality does similarly for pluralitarian
systems+ A problem with using either of these measures is that a number of countries have pr  plu-
rality  1, indicating the presence of both systems+ Coding according to housesys is cleaner and
leads to a measure that is either proportional or pluralitarian, but not both+
45+ See, for example, McGillivray 1997+
46+ Powell and Whitten 1993+
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for economic outcomes! will be more likely the easier it is for voters to attribute
economic outcomes to a particular party or coalition+ So more cohesive coalitions
have greater incentives to use economic policies for political purposes, while looser
ones have fewer incentives+47
We extend the hypothesis about proportionate versus majoritarian systems by
interacting proportional and ~1 proportional! with Herfindahl indices of party
concentration in the government ~herfgov! and opposition ~herfopp!+We define
the difference govcohesion herfgov herfopp to measure party cohesion in
the government relative to the opposition+ The greater is herfdiff, the more cohe-
sive is the government coalition; the smaller is herfdiff, the more fractured the
government and0or the more united the opposition+ We use the two interactions,
prop govcohesion proportionalherfdiff and plur govcohesion ~1
 proportional!  herfdiff, to test the idea that plurality plus party cohesion
in government ~relative to the opposition! leads to greater success in legislative vot-
ing than proportionality plus party cohesion within the government+
H1.2: A majoritarian system with cohesion among parties in power favors special
interests more (that is, have lower a’s) than does a proportional system with the
same party cohesion.
At the heart of electoral competition models with lobbying is the fraction a of
uninformed voters+We capture two different dimensions of what it means for vot-
ers to be “uninformed+” In the GH96 model ~and the Baron model upon which it
is based! uninformed voters are impressionable voters who do not know the pol-
icy positions of candidates+ We capture the idea of uninformed voters as impres-
sionable voters using two variables+ The first variable is the proportion of the
population that is illiterate ~illiteracy!, which directly measures that part of the
population whose opinions are more vulnerable to campaign spending+ There is
some evidence that lower literacy is associated with being uninformed politically,
even in developed countries+ A primary survey by Blais and colleagues48 of Cana-
dian voters indicated that high school dropouts indicated not knowing about a large
proportion of high-profile political candidates, relative to those who had com-
pleted university+ In developing countries this problem is worse+ Bardhan and
Mookherjee49 add that political capture by lobbies in developing countries is ~1!
decreasing in the average level of political awareness, and ~2! increasing in the
awareness disparity across economic classes+ These, in turn are correlated with
illiteracy and poverty+
47+ In order to admit more than two parties, we assume that each party uses its platform to seek
absolute majority in the legislature+The largest winning party’s platform may be bent after the coali-
tion forms in legislature, but in its final form it is close to the winning party’s platform+
48+ Blais et al+ 2000, tab+ 1+
49+ Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000+
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The second variable is the proportion of the population that is urbanized ~urban-
ization!+ It captures two ideas+ One is the well documented evidence in devel-
oped and developing countries that rural voters are likely to be less informed than
urban voters+ In Majumdar,Mani, and Mukand50 information discrepancy between
rural and urban populations is the reason why urban areas get more than a dispro-
portionate share of public goods+ Rural residents are poorly positioned to ascer-
tain the relative importance of government neglect versus exogenous shocks in
bringing about a low output in rural areas+51 Active media and better education
make the urban population less easy to fool+ A government will therefore expend
resources in generating more favorable urban outcomes, despite the fact that they
are outnumbered by their rural populations+Majumdar and colleagues present strik-
ing facts about the information divide ~measured by newspaper readership, and
per capita radio and television ownership! between the rural versus urban popula-
tions in Nepal, Pakistan, India, and Philippines+ They especially starkly document
the difference in literacy rates in the poorer Asian and Latin American countries+52
Thus, while the variable illiteracy captures the cross-sectional variation in lit-
eracy across our sample, the variable urbanization captures the intracountry dif-
ferences in informed versus uninformed voters+53
The second is that information externalities make densely populated urban areas
naturally positioned to obtain information+54 Scale economies afforded by urban
agglomeration support an explosion of radio stations, TV channels, and news-
papers, while the smaller and more scattered rural populations elude these scale
economies+ The news barrage that accompanies elections is more likely to sway
the rural population unused to the blitz than the more habituated urban population+
The diversity of views about characteristics of the parties other than their trade
policy positions ~the parameter f in hypothesis ~3!! is measured by a variable lrdi-
vide that indicates the left-right divide between the largest party in government
and the largest party in opposition+55 It takes the value 1 if the former leans left or
right and the latter leans the other way+ If both lean the same way, or if either
party is centrist, then the two sides are not considered to be ideologically polar-
ized, and lrdivide takes the value 0+ If extra-issue characteristics are strong in
the minds of voters, then they will not turn away from their preferred parties even
50+ Majumdar, Mani, and Mukand 2004+
51+ Despite the poor government response to weather shocks in February 2008 in China, the ~gen-
erally less informed! Chinese population blamed the weather more than their government+ The more
informed population of the U+S+ were much less forgiving of their government for their laxity during
Hurricane Katrina in 2005+
52+ Majumdar, Mani, and Mukand 2004, tab+ 1+
53+ Dutt and Mitra’s 2002 findings suggest that inequality can work both ways: an increase in inequal-
ity raises trade barriers in capital-abundant economies and lowers them in capital-scarce economies+
Since urbanization and illiteracy are both positively correlated with inequality, this finding sug-
gests we should find evidence for or against this hypothesis+
54+ See, for example, Stromberg 2004+
55+ In the DPI they are, respectively, fgovrlc and fopprlc+
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when those parties distort policies and impose welfare losses on them+ The left-
right divide engenders strong priors and ideal positions in the minds of voters,
thus capturing this central idea behind hypothesis ~3!+56
We measure the ~inverse of ! productivity of campaign spending parameter h in
hypothesis ~4! by advertising expenditures scaled by gross domestic product ~GDP!
in 1996, using data on media costs from WAT+ Missing data were supplemented
from Euromonitor+57 Since it measures the number of advertising dollars spent in
order to “generate” a country’s GDP, or net sales, the advertising expenditure-to-
GDP ratio measures the ~average! inverse productivity of advertising expendi-
tures+ Since TV advertising comprises a large fraction of advertising expenditures,
accounting for between 30 percent and 60 percent for most countries in the sam-
ple, we employ the variable tvadvertising_gdpTV advertising spending scaled
by GDP+58 Results using the more encompassing variable totaladvertising_gdp
 total advertising spending on all media ~including newspapers, magazines, radio,
and TV! scaled by GDP are similar to those we report+ The ~inverse! productivity
of campaign spending h is thus measured by this inverse-productivity of advertising+
The variable checks in the DPI is used to measure executive checks and bal-
ances on the powers of legislators ~hypothesis ~5!!+ checks takes integer values
between 1 ~Indonesia and Mauritius in our sample! and 15 ~India!+59 The theory
presumes that the executive is presumed to represent the interests of the median
voter, and is therefore a restraining influence on the agenda setter+ The variable
checks answers the question of whether this is true in the data+ Since checks
grades according to the propensity of the system to duel the legislature on issues,
56+ Dutt and Mitra 2005 find that left-wing governments adopt more protectionist trade policies in
capital-rich countries, but adopt more pro-trade policies in labor-rich countries than right-wing gov-
ernments+ Our theory does not make this subtler distinction, and so we do not interact lrdivide with
the capital-labor ratio, but this extension is worth exploring theoretically and empirically in future
research+
57+ See Euromonitor International 2004 and 2008+ An ideal measure of advertising cost is the price
per 30-second advertisement divided by the viewership, or the cost of a commercial per viewer ~for
example, Stratmann 2007!+ However, such a viewership measure is not available at the scope of our
set of countries, and we use a proxy for this ideal measure+
58+ Prat and Stromberg 2006 document the Swedish experience before and after the entry of com-
mercial TV+ They find that people who started watching commercial TV news increased their level of
political knowledge more than those who did not, and also increased their political participation+ They
conclude that commercial TV news attracts ex ante uninformed voters+
59+ The variable checks equals one for countries where the executive is not competitively elected+
checks is incremented by one if there is a chief executive+ checks is further incremented by one if the
chief executive is competitively elected+ checks is then incremented by one if the opposition controls
the legislature+ In presidential systems, checks is incremented by one ~1! for each chamber of the
legislature, unless the president’s party has a majority in the lower house and a closed list system is in
effect, ~a closed list system implies stronger presidential control of her party, and therefore of the
legislature!, and ~2! for each party coded as allied with the president’s party and which has an ideo-
logical ~left-right-center! orientation closer to that of the main opposition party than to that of the
president’s party+ In parliamentary systems, checks is incremented by one ~1! for every party in the
government coalition as long as the parties are needed to maintain a majority, and ~2! for every party
in the government coalition that has a position on economic issues ~right-left-center! closer to the
largest opposition party than to the party of the executive+
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it is a more sophisticated measure than required by the theory+We therefore exper-
iment with a binary reduction of checks ~Binarychecks! that simply measures
the existence of checks, as required by the theory+60
The dilution of the executive’s ability to champion a stringent platform of sup-
port for the median voter when they themselves require monetary help from spe-
cial interests to win elections ~hypothesis ~6!! requires measurement of executive
electoral competition+ The DPI variable eiec ~executive index of electoral compe-
tition! is well suited for this purpose+ eiec varies between 1 and 7, where 1 indi-
cates no executive and 7 indicates the most severe competition in executive elections+
In our sample eiec  2 for two countries ~Indonesia and Mauritius! specifying
unelected executive, eiec 6 for three countries ~Egypt, Romania, and Singapore!
specifying that candidates from more than one party contested and the largest party
received more than 75 percent of the votes, and eiec 7 for all others specifying
that candidates from more than one party contested and the largest party received
less than 75 percent of the votes+We also experiment with a binary version of eiec
~beiec! where beiec 0 if eiec , 7, and beiec 1 if eiec 7+
The final hypothesis, about divided government ~hypothesis ~7!!, measures a
specific source of checks on the powers of the legislature+ We measure divided
government with two variables+ The first, allhouse from the DPI, indicates whether
the party of the executive has absolute majority in the houses that have lawmak-
ing powers+ If so, allhouse takes the value 1, otherwise government is divided
and the variable takes the value 0+ The second variable, esimilarity, measures
whether the executive and the largest party in government are ideologically simi-
lar+ It takes the value 1 if, when the executive is leftist or rightist or centrist, the
largest government party also leans similarly+ Otherwise, government is divided
and esimilarity takes the value 0+ Perhaps surprisingly, the two variables are uncor-
related in our sample+ We note that the variable checks, used to measure control
of the legislature by the executive, also subsumes the case of divided government+
In fact, the empirical correlation between allhouse and checks is approximately
0+50+ To some extent, therefore checks, allhouse, and esimlarity are all legit-
imate measures of divided government+
Results
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for variables just described from the sample
of fifty democracies+ The dependent variable we will use is the log of the esti-
mated a’s+ Its outstanding characteristic is that it satisfies normality and is there-
fore outlier-free+ This is a useful property, since small clusters of observations can
no longer overly influence the outcome of the regression+
About half the sample uses a primarily proportionate system of representation
in the legislature, and half primarily use plurality+ The sample mean for illiter-
60+ de Figueiredo 2002 finds that when political turnover is likely to be high ~here, Binarychecks
equals 1!, the executives is more able to maintain checks if government is fractured+
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TABLE 3. Variable Description and Descriptive Statistics
Source Variable Description Mean sd Min Max
Estimated ln~a! log of a 1+313 1+515 2+813 6+002
WDR proportional 1 if House seats allocated on a proportional basis; 0 if allocated on plurality
~first-past-the-post winner! basis
0+520 0+505 0 1
WDR legcohesion Cohesion among parties in the legislature that form the government Herfind-
ahl index of number of parties in government Herfindahl index of number
of parties in opposition
0+232 0+274 0+554 0+989
WDR proplegcohesion proportional  legcohesion 0+096 0+218 0+554 0+572
WDR plurlegcohesion ~1 proportional!  legcohesion 0+137 0+234 0+036 0+989
WDR illiteracy percent of population with no primary education or with less than secondary
school education
0+134 0+183 0 0+630
WDR urbanization percent of population living in urban area 0+617 0+225 0+111 1
DPI lrdivide 1 if largest government party in legislature is ideologically different ~leftist or
rightist! from the largest opposition party+ 0 otherwise+
0+360 0+485 0 1
WAT tvadvertising_gdp Inverse productivity of advertising spending  $ of television advertising
expenditures per thousand $ of GDP
2+106 1+608 0+003 6+867
DPI checks Executive checks on the legislature 4+000 2+195 1 15
DPI Binarychecks Binary measure of executive checks on the legislature: 1 if checks . 7, 0
otherwise+
0+040 0+198 0 1
DPI eiec Executive index of electoral competitiveness 6+740 1+006 2 7
DPI beiec Binary measure of executive electoral competitiveness: 1 if eiec  7, 0 other-
wise
0+900 0+303 0 1
DPI allhouse Undivided government: 1 if party of executive has majority in the legislature, 0
otherwise
0+460 0+503 0 1
DPI esimilarity Ideological similarity of executive and largest party in government: 1 if both
are leftist, rightist, or centrist, 0 otherwise
0+800 0+404 0 1
Notes: All statistics for fifty countries+ Only countries with elected legislatures up to 1996 in the sample+ China, Ethiopia, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are dropped+ DPI  Database on
Political Institutions ~Beck et al+ 2001!, WDR  various issues of the World Development Report, and WAT  World Advertising Trends ~1998!+ See section on data for detailed
definitions and original sources+
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acy is 13+4 percent and for urbanization is 61+7 percent+ Both variables have con-
siderable variation across the sample+ 36 percent of the countries in the sample have
ideologically widely divided legislatures ~lrdivide!+ The average spending on TV
advertising per dollar of GDP varies from +003 cents ~very productive! to 6+867
cents ~unproductive!, with an average of 2+1 cents+ In only two countries are there
stringent checks on the legislature by the executive ~Binarychecks1!+ In 90 per-
cent of the sample, the executive faces electoral competition ~beiec1!+ In 46 per-
cent of the sample, government is politically undivided ~allhouse!, while in 80
percent of the sample, government is ideologically undivided ~esimilarity 1!+
The central empirical results are presented in Table 4+61 A concern with using the
estimated a’s as the dependent variable is that it has extreme values, implying the
existence of outliers+ For example, a is estimated at 404+0 for Singapore but the next
highest is only 37+8 ~Japan!+ Indeed, the Shapiro-Wilk test62 strongly rejects the
hypothesis that the a’s came from a normally distributed population+ ln~a!, how-
ever, passes the normality test+ The error terms from the fitted models in Table 4 do
as well ~see tests at the bottom of the table!+ The adjusted R2 statistics attest to the
adequate fit on the models+ Model 1 uses the continuous variable checks and eiec
to capture the impact of executive checks and executive electoral competition, while
Model 2 uses their binary versions ~Binarychecks and beiec!+
Contrary to the literature on proportional versus pluralitarian systems as sources
of diverse policy outcomes, we find that this choice has no influence on govern-
ments’ welfare-mindedness+ This finding is in fact consistent with the GH96 assump-
tion of two parties and the country voting as a single constituency, which implies
that the two systems are equivalent+ The rejection of hypothesis ~1! may also be
due to the existence of many parties in the system—the three-party example that
motivated the hypothesis may simply exaggerate the probability of protectionist
bias in majoritarian versus proportional systems+ The interaction of proportional-
ity with legislative cohesion has a positive and statistically significant coefficient,
indicating that proportionality plus a legislature in which there are fewer parties
in the governing coalition than in the opposition, leads to a greater concern for
welfare+ But so is the coefficient on the interaction of plurality with legislative
cohesion in Model 1+ Further, their sizes are statistically the same, indicating that
legislative cohesion, not proportionality or plurality, is the driving force behind
the result+ Thus, Model 1 rejects hypothesis ~1+2! as well+ While Model 2 finds
support for this hypothesis, it is weak+ We conclude that a is determined not by
61+ We will maintain the exogeneity of all regressors on the grounds that they are unrelated to the
error term of the regression+ That is, shocks to a do not “cause” changes in any of these variables+ This
is in keeping with a basic premise of our inquiry, as in the literature to date on institutions as a source
of the quality of policy outcomes, that institutions pre-date and determine outcomes+ To the extent that
there is stasis in institutions, they are exogenous+ Certainly, institutions react to poor outcomes but the
ability to do so is conditioned on other institutions more than the source of the shock ~see, for exam-
ple, Bueno de Mesquita et al+ 2003!+
62+ Shapiro and Wilk 1965+
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whether a system is proportional or pluralitarian, but by party concentration in the
governing coalition versus the opposition in government+
Since illiteracy and urbanization measure voter informedness, they serve
to test the central presumption of electoral competition theory that attracting the
votes of uninformed voters make policy platforms responsive to special interest
money+ The centrality of uninformed voting has strong empirical backing+ The
coefficients on both measures are statistically significant in the expected direc-
tions+ Even more important, they are politically and economically significant+ The
TABLE 4. Hypothesis tests about determinants of a OLS estimates: dependent
variable ln(a!
Hypothesis Variable Model 1 Model 2
EC: Proportional versus plurality ~H1! proportional 0+037 0+102
@0+11# @0+32#
EC: Proportional versus plurality ~H1+2! proplegcohesion 1+46 0+99
@2+71#*** @1+90#*
EC: Proportional versus plurality ~H1+2! plurlegcohesion 1+376 0+338
@2+55#** @0+62#
EC: Uninformed voting ~H2! illiteracy 2+759 3+665
@2+76#*** @3+52#***
EC: Uninformed voting ~H2! urbanization 3+821 3+175
@3+79#*** @3+89#***
EC: Ideological attachment to party ~H3! lrdivide 0+746 0+688
@2+20#** @2+19#**
EC: Productivity of media spending ~H4! tvadvertising_gdp 0+214 0+211
@1+65# @1+75#*
LB: Executive checks on legislators ~H5! checks 0+153
@3+24#***
LB: Executive checks on legislators ~H5! Binarychecks 1+809
@3+88#***
LBEC: Executive electoral competition eiec 0+368
~H6! @3+60#***
LBEC: Executive electoral competition beiec 1+576
~H6! @3+61#***
LB: Undivided government ~H7! allhouse 0+296 0+369
@1+03# @1+31#
LB: Undivided government ~H7! esimilarity 0+326 0+496
@0+99# @1+65#
Constant 0+537 0+68
@0+59# @0+90#
N 50 50
Adjusted R2 0+67 0+72
Tests (p-values reported):
Hypothesis 1.2 0+368 0+901
Normality of ln(a) 0+209 0+209
Normality of errors 0+934 0+779
Notes: Absolute t-statistics ~using White-corrected standard errors! in parentheses+
*denotes statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% “EC”  electoral competition theory, “LB”  leg-
islative bargaining theory+ Normality tests report p-values for the Shapiro–Wilk test+
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coefficients imply that an increase in illiteracy of 0+10 decreases a by 27+59 per-
cent, and an increase in urbanization of 0+10 increases a by 38+21 percent+ Hypoth-
esis ~2!—a’s relationship with the proportion of voters that are uninformed—is
thus strongly validated+ These results suggest that the source of the divide between
poor and rich countries noted in Table 2 is that less developed countries have largely
rural as well as less literate populations than developed countries+ For those rea-
sons, less developed countries have lower a’s+
Hypothesis ~3! is also strongly affirmed+ The greater the ideological divide
between parties contesting for the legislature, the lower is a+ All else constant, a
country with contesting parties that are ideologically close ~lrdivide 0! has an
a that is 74+6 percent higher than in a country with parties that are ideologically
far apart ~lrdivide 1!+63 Thus, the larger their unshakeable voter base, the more
their platforms cater to special interests, since the parties do not fear losing voters
over trade policy contests+
The estimates affirm hypothesis ~4! about the productivity of expenditures to
sway voters+ We find that the more cost-effective is each TV advertising dollar,
the less welfare-oriented is government+ That is, if an advertising dollar is able to
convert many uninformed voters, then economic logic dictates more advertising
dollars are spent+ Since lobbies are the source of the supply of advertising dollars,
policy platforms are pushed in their direction+ The quantitative impact is notable+
The results show that a decrease in tvadvertising_gdp by 1 ~that is, a decrease
in TV advertising revenue of $1 per thousand dollars of GDP! raises a by 21+4
percent+ This finding has implications for the difference in the welfare-mindedness
of developed versus developing countries+ Since developing countries have much
lower ratios of tvadvertising_gdp than developed countries, more productive
media dollars ~combined with greater proportion of voters that are uninformed!
are another reason why their governments are less welfare minded+64
Turning to the legislative bargaining hypotheses, both measures of checks and
balances ~checks in Model 1 and Binarychecks in Model 2! are positive and sta-
tistically significant+ An increase in checks of one standard deviation ~around 2!
is associated with a 30+6 percent increase in a, all else constant+ In most countries
checks falls in the 1–7 range, with India as the sole extreme data point with a
score of 15+ The India observation may therefore be influential in determining the
regression coefficient on checks+ Recoding the India value to, for example, 8 or
9, does not alter the statistical or political significance of checks ~the coefficient
is larger though less precise!+
63+ A more precise measure of this impact that takes into account the variance of the estimate ~Ken-
nedy 1981! shows that a country with lrdivide  0 has an a that is 55 percent ~obtained as eb10
2Var~b!  1, where b is the estimated coefficient on lrdivide, and Var~b! its variance! higher than in a
country with lrdivide  1, all else constant+
64+ In Morocco, Bangladesh, Guatemala, Pakistan, Bolivia, India, Cameroon, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Egypt,
Romania, Kenya, Turkey, and Malawi this ratio is less than 1, indicating advertising is many times
cheaper per dollar of GDP than in developed countries like Japan and the United States+
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When Binarychecks equals 1, it indicates a fractured government and a pow-
erful executive ~the ability of the executive to check the powers of the legislature
are magnified!+65 This definition of the Binarychecks variable gives the best chance
for the theory to perform, rather than one where the executive is defined to be
only marginally powerful+ The theory holds up well+ The estimates imply that, all
else equal, countries with effective checks by the executive ~Binarychecks  1!
have a welfare-for-lobbying tradeoff that is 180+9 percent more expensive than
countries without checks+ This affirmation of the idea that the executive can effec-
tively wield checks on the ability of the legislature to sell out is all the more remark-
able considering that Binarychecks1 for only two countries—India and Pakistan+
If the executive must face electoral competition, then the same forces that came
into play in shaping the platforms of legislators also come into play here+ Since
special interests now wield influence over the platforms of candidates for the exec-
utive, electoral competition reduces the welfare-mindedness of the executive+ The
results strongly affirm this mechanism+ Both, the executive index of electoral com-
petition eiec and its binary version beiec are statistically and politically signifi-
cant+ beiec indicates that, all else equal, a country in which the executive does not
face competition at the polls has an a that is 157+6 percent more than a country
whose executive does+ The finer measure eiec indicates that an increase in the
index of 1 unit ~approximately one standard deviation! lowers a by 36+8 percent+
As argued theoretically, greater electoral competition for the executive diminishes
the positive impact of executive checks on a+ Since the office of the executive is,
more often than not, a competitive selection, this extension to the legislative bar-
gaining literature brings it closer to the real world+
Undivided government does not appear to have any impact on a after control-
ling for the other variables+ To be fair to the theoretical literature on divided gov-
ernments, the electoral competition variables checks and Binarychecks are also
good measures of the incidence and extent of divided government+ The high cor-
relation between allhouse and checks of 0+50 also empirically affirms that
checks picks up the effect of divided government+ The aforementioned findings
about these two variables imply that divided government causes lowers a’s, in
keeping with our theory ~and other mechanisms in the literature that show that
divided governments can cause good policy outcomes!+ If checks and Binary-
checks really are measures of divided government rather than measures of the
ability of the executive to impose checks, in order to test the basic precept of the
legislative bargaining theory ~hypothesis ~5!!, we would need a sample in which
some countries have no ~elected or unelected! executive, only a legislature+ Unfor-
tunately, our sample has no such cases and does not allow that experiment+
A number of hypotheses about institutions and the a parameter were tested using
the estimates in Table 4+ Which of those influences is strongest? Table 5 reports
unit-free beta coefficients that may be used to compare the influence of the vari-
65+ See fn 59+
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ables+ These coefficients simply indicate the number of standard deviations that
the dependent variable changes if an independent variable is increased by one stan-
dard deviation+ As such, this measure favors the size of the coefficient over its
statistical precision+ urbanization has the largest influence on a, making the
uninformed voter hypothesis stand out among the hypotheses as an important force
behind a+ illiteracy is influential as well, lending more credence to the uninformed
voter model+ Other variables that are influential are the same variables that stood
out as being statistically significant in Table 4+ The statistically insignificant coef-
ficients are imprecise, but also small+
Sensitivity Analysis
We report the results from a set of stress tests we have conducted in order to inves-
tigate the robustness ~or fragility! of the inferences made thus far+ Although the
dependent variable ln~a! passed the test of normality ~implying the absence of
outliers! we re-estimated the models using a robust estimator based on minimiz-
ing a weighted sum of squared errors, where large outliers are given smaller weights
according to Tukey’s criterion+ Not surprisingly, the results are qualitatively and
quantitatively similar+ These are reported in Table 6+
Since the a parameters were estimated, we performed a weighted regression
with weights inversely proportional to the squares of the standard errors+ That is,
we estimated a simple heteroskedastic regression using information about the esti-
mated variance of ln~a!+66 These results are reported in the last two columns of
Table 7+ There are some notable differences+ The coefficient on illiteracy is no
longer as precisely estimated, and has the opposite sign+ Neither checks nor Binary
checks are statistically significantly different from zero+ However, allhouse is
now statistically and politically significant, preserving our inference about divided
government which was based on checks and Binarychecks+ Finally, esimilarity
is positive and statistically significant+ These result deserve explaining+
The a’s are more tightly estimated for developed countries ~in part because their
sample sizes are larger!, and therefore the heteroskedastic regressions put greater
weights on developed countries+ Since their populations have high literacy rates,
illiteracy has low variance in the subsample of developed countries, and loses
its statistical significance+ The coefficients on checks and Binarychecks are not
significant for the same reason+ However, allhouse has considerable variance
in the subsample, which enables a more precise estimation of its influence+ The
estimate implies that, all else equal, if the party of the executive also controls the
House ~allhouse  1! then a is 65+1 percent lower than if government were
politically undivided ~Model 1!+ Contrary to what we imagined, ideological sim-
ilarity between the executive and the leading political party in government has
66+ The standard errors of ln~a! were computed using the delta method, presuming that the only
source of error is measurement error+
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the converse effect, at least in developed countries+ If the executive and largest
party in the legislature are ideologically similar ~esimilarity  1! then a is 92+8
percent higher than otherwise+ It appears that politically divided government has
very different implications for the behavior of governments than ideological divi-
sions+67 Political division produces outcomes that are welfare-oriented while ideo-
logical division is adversarial+ We note that the two variables are uncorrelated in
the data+
In a widely cited paper, Levine and Renelt68 critiqued the empirical literature
on economic growth for producing what turn out to be quite fragile inferences+ A
root cause of the fragility in cross-country regressions are ~conditional! correla-
tions among the regressor variables+As a result, a particular combination of regres-
sors may yield a striking and significant coefficient on a variable, but other
combinations may fail to come up with any result of note+ The Levine-Renelt sen-
sitivity analysis consists of choosing a focus variable and a group of regressors
that are relevant to the regression, and estimating as many regressions as there are
subsets of those regressors ~with k regressors there are 2k possible subsets!+ The
highest and lowest coefficient estimates on the issue variable from these regres-
67+ The Lohmann-O’Halloran conclusion that undivided government leads to better welfare, while
not validated by the measures of politically undivided government allhouse and checks, is validated
by the measure of ideologically undivided government, esimilarity+
68+ Levine and Renelt 1992+
TABLE 5. Beta coefficients
Theory Variable OLS1 OLS2
H1 EC: Proportional versus plurality proportional 0+01 0+03
H1+2 EC: Proportional versus plurality proplegcohesion 0+21 0+14
H1+2 EC: Proportional versus plurality plurlegcohesion 0+21 0+05
H2 EC: Uninformed voting illiteracy 0+33 0+44
H2 EC: Uninformed voting urbanization 0+57 0+47
H3 EC: Ideological attachment to party lrdivide 0+24 0+22
H4 EC: Productivity of media spending tvadvertising_gdp 0+23 0+22
H5 LB: Executive checks on legislators checks 0+22
H5 LB: Executive checks on legislators Binarychecks 0+24
H6 LB: Executive electoral competition eiec 0+24
H6 LB: Executive electoral competition beiec 0+32
H7 LB: Undivided government allhouse 0+10 0+12
H7 LB: Undivided government esimilarity 0+09 0+13
Notes: Beta coefficients are regression coefficients of the standardized dependent variable on standardized explana-
tory variables+
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sions is then reported+ If the maximum and minimum have the same sign ~and are
statistically significant!, then inference about the variable is robust to the choice
of regressors+ We perform a similar exercise but use a softer stick to judge the
results+ The results are reported in Table 8+
Consider the issue variable proportional, and the eight other regressors illit-
eracy, urbanization, lrdivide, tvadvertising_gdp, checks, eiec, allhouse,
and esimilarity+ From these eight we choose the 212 combinations comprising
one regressor variable ~8 combinations!, two regressor variables ~28!, three regres-
TABLE 6. Robust (to Outliers) regressions
Dependent variable: ln(a)
Model 1 Model 2
H1 proportional 0+052 0+172
@0+14# @0+48#
H1+2 proplegcohesion 1+314 0+968
@1+83#* @1+41#
H1+2 plurlegcohesion 1+299 0+375
@1+63# @0+49#
H2 illiteracy 3+299 4+045
@2+75#*** @3+36#***
H2 urbanization 3+257 3+182
@3+15#*** @3+28#***
H3 lrdivide 0+656 0+689
@1+81#* @1+98#*
H4 tvadvertising_gdp 0+17 0+19
@1+38# @1+61#
H5 checks 0+152
@1+96#*
H5 Binarychecks 1+927
@2+43#**
H6 eiec 0+328
@2+17#**
H6 beiec 1+534
@3+30#***
H7 allhouse 0+276 0+28
@0+76# @0+87#
H7 esimilarity 0+228 0+503
@0+64# @1+45#
Constant 0+788 0+706
@0+59# @0+77#
N 50 50
Adjusted R2 0+69 0+75
Note: Absolute t-statistics in parentheses:
*denotes statistical significance at 10%; ** at 5%; and *** at 1%
Weighted regressions, with weights inversely related to residuals+
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sor variables ~56!, and four regressor variables ~70!+69 We conduct two types of
robustness checks+ The first, TYPE A Robustness, is a soft test asking whether any
among the one-, two-, three-, or four-variable combinations produces maximum
and minimum estimates on proportional so that both have the same sign and
both are statistically significant at 10 percent+ We conclude that proportional
does not produce any robust inferences at all+ This may not come as a surprise
69+ More than four could be chosen, but the 212 combinations provide a fair idea of robustness to
choice of regressors+ prop legcohesion and plur legcohesion are included in every regression+
TABLE 7. Weighted regressions with dependent variable: ln(a)
OLS Weighted OLS
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
H1 proportional 0+037 0+102 0+01 0+032
@0+11# @0+32# @0+03# @0+11#
H1+2 proplegcohesion 1+46 0+99 0+941 0+522
@2+71#*** @1+90#* @1+47# @1+01#
H1+2 plurlegcohesion 1+376 0+338 1+448 1+039
@2+55#** @0+62# @1+39# @1+21#
H2 illiteracy 2+759 3+665 1+903 1+824
@2+76#*** @3+52#*** @1+24# @1+39#
H2 urbanization 3+821 3+175 2+961 1+619
@3+79#*** @3+89#*** @2+45#** @1+57#
H3 lrdivide 0+746 0+688 0+418 0+38
@2+20#** @2+19#** @1+57# @1+89#*
H4 tvadvertising_gdp 0+214 0+211 0+183 0+229
@1+65# @1+75#* @1+93#* @3+00#***
H5 checks 0+153 0+015
@3+24#*** @0+17#
H5 Binarychecks 1+809 1+457
@3+88#*** @0+98#
H6 eiec 0+368 0+86
@3+60#*** @2+66#**
H6 beiec 1+576 2+128
@3+61#*** @5+38#***
H7 allhouse 0+296 0+369 0+651 0+708
@1+03# @1+31# @2+58#** @3+52#***
H7 esimilarity 0+326 0+496 0+928 1+072
@0+99# @1+65# @2+75#*** @3+92#***
Constant 0+537 0+68 5+04 1+887
@0+59# @0+90# @1+99#* @2+14#**
N 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0+67 0+72 0+53 0+69
Notes: Absolute t-statistics in parentheses: * denotes statistical significance at 10%; ** at 5%; and *** at 1%+ First
two columns are ordinary least squares ~OLS! estimates from Table 4+Weighted OLS estimates use the inverse of the
variance of ln~a! as weights+
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considering the low level of precision with which it was estimated in the first place+
But do the coefficients that were estimated with statistical significance hold up to
the Type A robustness check? illiteracy, urbanization, tvadvertising_gdp,
and beiec do+ To some extent, so do lrdivide, checks, Binarychecks, and eiec+
For example, lrdivide produces robust inferences with any three or four of the
eight regressors+
Type B Robustness indicates whether the interval for each issue variable con-
structed from the full set of 212 regressor combinations contains zero ~and is there-
TABLE 8. Sensitivity analysis: extreme bounds
TYPE A robustness TYPE B robustness
Variable Robust bounds exist? Estimates t-value Influential regressors Robust?
H1 proportional No high 0+173 0+445 illiteracy No
base 0+037 0+110
low 0+634 1+068
H2 illiteracy Yes high 1+963 1+647 none Robust
All combinations base 2+759 2+760
low 6+962 6+296
H2 urbanization Yes high 6+311 8+555 none Robust
All combinations base 3+821 3+788
low 2+692 2+899
H3 lrdivide Yes high 0+435 0+811 illiteracy, Robust
3 or 4 variable base 0+746 2+199 urbanization
combos low 0+818 2+155
H4 tvadvert_gdp Yes high 0+685 6+164 none Robust
All combinations base 0+214 1+655
low 0+204 1+646
H5 checks Yes high 0+176 2+696 illiteracy, No
3 or 4 variable base 0+153 3+244 urbanization
combos low 0+092 0+763 No
H5 Binarychecks Yes high 2+152 2+468
2, 3 or 4 variable base 1+809 3+876 tvadvertising_gdp
combos low 0+971 0+766
H6 eiec Yes high 0+037 0+153 illiteracy, No
2, 3 or 4 variable base 0+368 3+602 urbanization,
combos low 0+374 2+335 tvadvertising_gdp
H6 beiec Yes high 0+856 1+098 Robust, but
All combinations base 1+576 3+614 weakly
low 1+767 3+287
H7 allhouse No high 0+074 0+195 illiteracy, No
base 0+296 1+030 urbanization
low 0+650 1+162
H7 esimilarity No high 0+537 1+496 illiteracy, No
base 0+326 0+991 tvadvertising_gdp
low 0+176 0+462
Note: The base estimates are from the first column of OLS estimates ~beiec and Binarychecks from the second! of
Table 4+ The “high” and “low” values are estimated as the max and min of the set of estimates using all possible
combinations of 1, 2, 3, and 4 regressors ~ 212 runs!+ TYPE A Robustness indicates intervals ~with 1, 2, 3, or 4
regressors, respectively! not containing zero, with both bounds statistically significant at 10%+ TYPE B Robustness
indicates the presence or absence of robust intervals across the ~212! sets of estimates for any issue variable+
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fore not robust!+ Since the bounds for illiteracy are both negative and statistically
significant, we conclude that the inference about the fraction of uninformed voters
is strongly robust to choice of regressors+ Thus, illiteracy, urbanization, tvad-
vertising_gdp, and beiec provide robust Type B inferences+ lrdivide, checks,
Binarychecks, and eiec provide inferences in which one of the bounds has an
absolute t value less than 1+6, and is therefore poorly measured+ The inferences
we have made from those coefficients are not as robust to the choice of regressors+
The adjacent column indicates variables whose inclusion undermines the infer-
ences from an issue variable+ It appears that inclusion of the variables illiter-
acy, urbanization, and tvadvertising_gdp weaken the ability of many other
variables to provide clear independent inferences+ These variables obviously cap-
ture a number of influences inherent in the issue variables, so that the partial cor-
relation of the issue variables with the dependent variable ln~a! is lowered once
they are included+ A lesson from this exercise is that it is possible to generate a set
of results from a specific regression, but if empirical results are to move theory
forward, they must demonstrate robustness+ Thus, our earlier inferences about
hypotheses H2 ~uninformed voting!, H4 ~productivity of media!, and H6 ~execu-
tive electoral competition! are robust, while those about H3 ~ideological attach-
ment! and H5 ~executive checks! are fragile+ The way forward empirically is to
construct better measures of ideological attachment and executive checks+Another
is to increase the sample to test these theories, which requires trade, protection,
and output data for more countries+
In a final set of robustness checks, we allow for other determinants of tariffs to
affect our estimates of a+ In the second section we fully embrace the GH94 setup
where governments maximize a weighted sum of special interest money and pub-
lic welfare+ But Rawlsian logic would predict that governments also care about
maintaining a fair living standard for all, especially lower income workers+ We
attempt to introduce these types of considerations by estimating equation ~10! using
three different types of additional control variables+ In the first specification we
introduced average worker wage ~in industry i at time t !+ In a second specification
we introduced average worker wage plus average worker productivity ~measured
as output per worker!, and in a third model we added average worker wage scaled
by the country’s per capita income+ Estimates of the a’s from these three models
are available upon request+ For most countries the additional regressors push the
estimates of a downward, sometimes strikingly+ The U+S+ estimate, for example,
declines from above 26 to less than 7, and similar declines are seen in a number
of developed countries+ The addition of the Rawlsian regressors suggests that if
the portion of tariffs used to protect worker incomes is separated from the portion
of tariffs that responds to special interest contributions, then countries are shown
to be much more responsive to special interests+ This is not always the case, and
the a’s for Nepal, Bangladesh, Malawi, Cameroon, Costa Rica, and India actually
increase as a result of the additional variables+
Do our inferences on the determinants of a change? The uninformed voters
hypothesis, the ideological attachment hypothesis, and the productivity of media
What Governments Maximize and Why 527
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090171
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 13:50:04, subject to the Cambridge Core
spending hypothesis continue to be affirmed with all three sets of new a’s+ However,
checks and Binarychecks may no longer be used to support the hypothesis about
executive electoral competition ~or about divided government!, and eiec and beiec
no longer support the hypothesis of executive electoral competition+ The legisla-
tive bargaining model faces empirical rejection if these are the correct a’s+ We
should, however, be reminded that adding ad hoc regressors to equation ~10! to
estimate the new a’s is atheoretical+ One could imagine a model where a is deter-
mined by the interaction of Rawlsian motives with legislative bargaining, which
would explain why the legislative bargaining variables are no longer statistically
significant once we control for Rawlsian motives when estimating a’s+ The idea of
structural estimation espoused in this paper emphasizes theory-based estimation,
whereas the results from the estimations here should be considered ad hoc+ The
new estimates of a are nevertheless interesting, and suggest that work on the theo-
retical foundations that may admit explanatory variables like wage and productiv-
ity in equation ~10! should prove worthwhile+
Finally, there are noteworthy differences in inferences about government’s
welfare-mindedness that may be made ~indirectly! using tariff data as the depen-
dent variable, and ~directly! using estimates of a as we have done+ Using the import-
weighted tariffs as the dependent variable in place of ln~a! yield estimates that
weakly support the uninformed voters hypothesis and the model of executive checks
and balances ~or divided government to the extent that checks measures it!, but
no others+ Given these differences, we strongly prefer to use our method+ It is the
more direct and theoretically relevant method for assessing the fundamental ques-
tion of why governments behave as they do+
Conclusion
This article has studied quantitatively the welfare-mindedness of governments
through the lens of trade policy determination+ Our analysis suggests a substan-
tial variation in government behavior in a cross-section of developed and devel-
oping countries+ The variation broadly matches our a priori beliefs of the weight
governments put on social welfare relative to industry lobbying when taking pol-
icy decisions+ They are also consistent with the perception index of corruption of
Transparency International+
More importantly, the determinants of this variation were theoretically moti-
vated, using models consistent with the one used to estimate welfare-mindedness
of governments+ These theories suggest specific political, economic, and institu-
tional variables as fundamental determinants of the variation in the behaviors of gov-
ernments+ Using a new database on political institutions we empirically test whether
these variables influence the welfare-mindedness of governments as the theories pre-
dict+ The results suggest that they do+ The most notable findings are the following+
Political institutions that have a larger number of checks and balances embedded
in the decision-making process cause more welfare-minded governments+ The more
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informed are voters, as measured by literacy and the degree of urbanization, the
greater is the weight that governments put on the welfare of their polity when mak-
ing trade policy decisions+ Finally, the more ideologically attached are voters to par-
ties and the greater the productivity of the media in influencing uninformed voters,
the less weight governments put on social welfare when making trade policy+
These results are, to the best of our knowledge, the first ones that are derived
from an underlying theory+ We have hinted at others that are potentially testable+
Such research can prove important for understanding and advocating policy+ We
caution against using the findings of this study to push a set of straitjacketed pol-
icies in the style of the Washington consensus ~WC!+ As countries grow richer,
their polities will be empowered to change their institutions+ It is best to direct
development aid not at institutional change in a country, but at activities that cre-
ate growth opportunities conditional on the institutional lacunae the country faces+
Experience with the WC policies have failed to show any evidence of institutional
change, while activity-based aid has been effective in permanently raising incomes+
Thus, our results that checks and balances are important determinants of welfare-
mindedness parameter a, should not be taken to suggest that aid by rich countries
be used to push governments to change their judicial system+ Likewise, our result
that urbanization is an important determinant of a does not suggest that aid should
push for urbanization+ Those changes need to be the outcome of complex endog-
enous processes, that governments and international agencies with limited infor-
mation and resources simply cannot make happen+ Institutional change is best left
to endogenous processes, as the failure of WC-style policies demonstrates+70
Finally, if an increase in welfare-mindedness is the motive for trade liberaliza-
tion, then the results in this article suggest that it is in fundamental institutional
change that the source of recent liberalization episodes across the world may be
found+ The observable fundamentals ~our regressors! serve to indicate which coun-
tries might be prepared to liberalize+ Countries that have succeeded in altering one
or more of these fundamentals may be ready to take the step toward liberalization+
Perhaps, with the appropriate incentives and design that minimize political and
economic risks, their governments could be convinced to undertake liberalization
programs that are politically sustainable+
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